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1 This  essay  argues  that,  contrary  to  a  good  deal  of  received  opinion,  the  classical
pragmatists,  C. S. Peirce, William James  and John Dewey,  had almost  no influence  as
regards the human sciences in the United States, and that in a stunning inversion, their
distinct views were absorbed by the mainstream and employed to justify mainstream
practices. Thus, for example, in her extremely well documented The Origins of American
Social Science (1991), Dorothy Ross quite correctly characterizes American social science as
“scientistic.” But she also argues that pragmatism and especially Dewey was a critical ally
in the American construction of the social sciences.1 The confusions here will take some
unpacking.
2 Broadly, my argument is this: We need to see, first, that the idea of science cannot be
taken  for  granted.  Through  the  work  of  a  host  of  late  19th  century  philosopher/
physicists, a positivist conception, originally put forward in 1830 by August Comte, won
out. It was powerfully fleshed out in the 1930s by Vienna logical empiricism and became
hegemonic.2 The  classical  pragmatists  were  well  aware  of  this  historically  critical
development.  Their  pragmatisms  were,  indeed,  self-conscious  efforts  to  provide  an
alternative conception.
3 Second, since the disciplines of the human sciences are not natural kinds but are socially
constructed by agents working with materials at hand, we need to provide at least a
sketch of a sketch of this construction. Writing prior to World War I, Thorstein Veblen
clearly understood what was going on. “Given the exigencies of competitive enterprise in
America,” with “business men” as executives of the new universities,  there was little
choice but to reward those who enhanced the position of the university in the larger
community.  The  result  is  “a  ‘science’  of  complaisant  interpretations,  apologies,  and
projected remedies” (1957: 136).
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4 Third, after considering the views of Peirce and James against the background of then
current  understandings  of  science,  I  develop  Dewey’s  largely  unacknowledged  and




5 In what became a stunningly prophetic conception, Comte had provided a clear definition
of  positivism,  the  “stage”  of  mind  which  follows  the  “theological”  and  the
“metaphysical.”
6 First, following Kant, he insisted that “metaphysical” and “fictitious” ideas were no part
of science. These included references to causes as productive powers, essences, first and
final causes and non-observable “forces.” For the positivist, then, science is empirical in
the  sense  that  it  deals  with  ideas  that  can  be  verified  (or  falsified)  by  appeal  to
experience. To be sure, there are problems in seeing exactly what counts as verifiability
(falsifiability) – problems that have haunted all recent empiricist theories of science.
7 Second, Comte argued that we should give up the search for causes in exactly the sense
that causes are productive powers. We should seek causes in Hume’s sense: that is, as
“invariable relations of succession and resemblance.” On this view, we cannot observe
(say)  the productive power of  opium or for that  matter,  of  gravity.  We see rather a
constant relation of succession: if one takes opium, one sleeps: Bodies near earth fall at D
=16t 2.
8 Third, following on the foregoing and most critically, the explanation of facts is simply a
deduction of an instance from general laws. Thus, on what is now called “the Deductive-
Nomological” model, “explanation” and prediction (what Comte called “prevision”) are
symmetrical: Having the law allows us to “explain” as well as to predict.
9 These ideas lay more or less fallow until the last decades of the 19th century when, with
the advance of chemistry, the culmination of classical physics and the development of
industrialized science, the precise nature of a genuine science became a critical problem,
hotly debated by an eminent group of philosopher/physicists in Germany, France and
England.
10 G. R. Kirchhoff’s Principles of Mechanics (1874), Ernst Mach’s Science of Mechanics (1883), and
Wilhelm  Ostwald’s  General  Chemistry  (1888)  were  among  the  first  blasts  to  ward
establishing  a  stringently  anti-metaphysical  empiricist  philosophy  of  science.4 These
writers were joined by Ludwig Boltzmann and Heinrich Hertz in Germany,  by Pierre
Duhem and Henri Poincaré in France, and in England by W. K. Clifford and, following the
path of Mach, by Karl Pearson. Thus,  Mach and Duhem, took the deductivist view of
explanation to its logical conclusion and held that science does not even try to explain; it
only describes. Writing in 1906, Pierre Duhem offers that “to explain […] is to strip reality
of the appearances covering it like a veil, in order to see bare reality itself,” but this is
metaphysics.  For  him,  “A  physical  theory  is  not  an  explanation.  It  is  a  system  of
mathematical  propositions deduced from a small  number of  mathematical  principles,
which aim to represent  as  simply,  as  completely,  and as  exactly as  possible a  set  of
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The Disciplinary Development of the Social Sciences
11 Unlike pears and porcupines, the disciplines of the social sciences are not “natural kinds”:
They exist only by virtue of beliefs and practices created by historical agents working
with materials at hand. And their social construction began in earnest in America only
some one hundred years ago.6 The question of the nature of the human sciences remained
open with at  least  four  competing conceptions;  a  positivist  view and three different
contestations  of  positivism:  a  “Marxist”  view  originating  with  Engels,  and  the  very
different  anti-positivisms  of  Dilthey  and  Weber.7 It  is  easy  to  show  why,  given  the
opportunity,  the  disciplines  were  constituted  in  positivist  terms.  Marxism  was  (and
remains?) anathema in the Universities of the “Free World”; Dilthey and Weber were
substantially unknown in the US and while both did develop positions which rejected the
“natural  science”  model  –  understood  as  a  positivism  –  neither  had  the  distinct
advantages of the positivist image of natural science, in particular the authority which
the mature natural sciences were then generating.
12 A persistent assumption of disciplinary histories of the social sciences is the idea that
each of the main branches of  today’s social  sciences reflects at least reasonably firm
strata of the social world. There is, thus, a “natural” division of labor that was finally
realized with the maturation of the distinct social sciences. Explaining the emergence of
the  disciplines,  then,  takes  the  form  of  showing  how  pathfinders,  interested  in
constituting  analogues  to  the  successful  modern  natural  sciences,  broke  from  the
“prescientific” past and established restricted domains for controlled inquiry. Each story
is different, of course, and some are stormier than others. Some, for example psychology,
are even less settled than others.
13 I give here but a hint of the key moves and players. At least in broad terms, it is easy to
identify  the  historical  process  which  generated  the  beliefs  and  practices  which
constituted  disciplinary  social  science.  Two  changes  of  enormous  importance  were
critical to the American institutionalization of the social sciences. First were the new
problems created by very rapid industrialization:  immigration,  urbanization and “the
social  problem.” Second,  usually ignored,  was the creation of  the modern “research”
University,  an American innovation on German practice.  Universities,  of  course,  had
existed in Europe for centuries, but as many observers have noted, “the true ancestor’s of
today’s universities are certainly not their medieval precursors.”8 Similarly, America had
“colleges” but the curriculum was “medieval” and culminated in “moral philosophy,”
frequently  taught  by  the  President,  who  was  often  a  cleric.  There  was  no  graduate
curriculum. Sensitive to their backwardness, but even more sensitive to the potential new
roles that a University could play,  academic entrepreneurs,  working closely with the
Rockefellers, Carnegies and Vanderbilts, built what was needed. Shored up by carefully
directed violence, racist politics could easily be joined to the politics of economic growth
and, in turn, both could be joined to technocratic solutions – solutions to be provided by
“experts” As Bledstein put it, “Americans lacked tradition as a source of authority, but
they did “not lack ‘science’.”9
14 Indeed,  was social  inquiry to be left  to the “metaphysical  philosophers,” the likes of
Henry George,  or to dilettantish reformers like Jane Addams or W. E. B. DuBois,  or to
irresponsible journalists,  like Jacob Riis? Surely social  problems were as  amenable to
scientific solutions as any other. And surely, if social scientists were to be professionals,
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they had to mark out their own scientific territory and establish their own system of
credentialing.  Academic departments,  the PhD,  professional  associations and journals
would provide exceptionally efficient means, then as now, for controlling the curriculum.
15 The first critical conceptual move was the divorce of history and the social sciences. This
process,  which  required  de-Germanization  and  de-historicism,  was  to  take  two
generations  beginning  with  creation  of  graduate  programs  in  the  social  sciences,
Columbia’s  School  of  Political  Science,  established  under  John  Burgess  in  1880,  and
Herbert B. Adams’s  Graduate  Program  in  Historical  Studies  at  Hopkins.  As  regards
Political  Economy,  America had a  version of  the Methodenstreit,  between Richard Ely,
inspired  by  the  Verein  für  Sozialpolitik,  and  Simon Newcombe,  an  able  and  articulate
spokesman for the abstract deductivist conception of political economy which Ricardo
had  inspired  and  which  J. S. Mill  had  tried  to  restrict.  John  Bates  Clark’s  original
integration  of  the  new marginalism effectively  “answered”  the  socialists  and  single-
taxers and was an important part of the ideological battle which had to be fought. Veblen
was  on  the  other  side,  offering  Peircean  criticisms of  the  new  marginalism.10 A
consequence of the American battle over the nature of political economy, impelled by
wholly independent institutional factors, was the opportunity provided to the “political
scientists” to establish “government” as their domain and to Franklin H. Giddings and
E. A. Ross, one of the first of Ely’s Wisconsin Ph.D.’s, to capture the residue under the
heading of an autonomous scientific sociology.
16 Giddings, the founder of the Colombia School of Sociology, had been reading Mach and
Pearson and was convinced by their arguments that in eschewing metaphysics, science
was actually descriptive rather than explanatory. “All science knew was the description
of concomitant and co-varying facts” (Quoted by Ross 1991: 238). Accordingly, statistical
methods were the “heart and soul of a scientific sociology.” Charles Merriam’s clarion call
of  1921,  “The Present State of  the Study of  Politics,”  was even clearer in seeing the
connection between positivist epistemology and Comte’s commitment to “prevision and
control.”  Thus,  he  writes  that  with  a  scientific  politics  which  quantified  data  and
identified “relations of variables,” it would be possible to have “a more intelligent control
of the process of government” (Quoted by Somit and Tanenhaus 1967: 11).
17 World War I  was  decisive  in  the  victory  of  positivist  social  science.  In  a  stunning
consensus, American social scientists enthusiastically encouraged American entry into
the war and then enthusiastically cooperated with the government in realizing America’s
self-defined mission “to make the world safe for democracy.” For Anglo-Americans, the
defeat of Germany represented, as well, the defeat of “metaphysical,” “statist,” historical
and holistic German social science. Long suspicious of it in any case, the war proved to
them that older British and French empirical philosophies, continuously represented in
the “old” political economy and in British utilitarian theories of government, had been
right all along.
18 Herbert Hoover’s 1929 gathering of a distinguished group of social scientists “to examine
the feasibility of a national survey of social trends” well marks the beginnings of the
contemporary vision of social science. Funded by the Rockefeller Foundation with the full
support  of  the  Social  Science  Research  Council  and  the  Encyclopedia  of  the  Social
Sciences, four years of work by hundreds of inquirers resulted in “The Ogburn Report,”
1600 pages  of  quantitative research.  Pitirim Sorokin,  who had no problems with the
appropriate use of statistics, observed:
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In the future some thoughtful investigator will probably write a very illuminating
study about  these  ‘quantitative  obsessions’  […]  tell  how such a  belief  became a
vogue,  how social  investigators tried to ‘measure’  everything; how thousands of
papers and research bulletins were filled with tables, figures, and coefficients; and
how  thousands  of  persons  never  intended  for  scientific  investigation  found  in
measurement and computation a substitute for real thought.11
19 Thenceforth, “researchers” could produce many tons of “findings,” and there would be
little danger that any of it would bear any “colour of iconoclasm.”
 
Classical Pragmatism
20 What of the pragmatists? By the turn of the century, it was clear to James, Veblen and
Dewey  that  science  was  giving  “its  tone  to  modern  culture.”  But  for  them,  the
consequences were more than uncertain.  The most  well-known advocates  of  science,
Spencer,  Clifford,  Huxley  and  others,  were  not  only  defending  agnosticism  and
positivism, but a view in which science was to be immunized from the biases and interests
of human communities. James, Veblen and Dewey were anything but enthusiastic about
the  situation  as  they  saw  it.  Indeed,  James’s  criticisms  hinged  on  ideas  about  the
foundations of science which were completely novel, and Veblen and Dewey were clearest
in seeing that science was being shaped by changes “in industry and in the economic
organization of  society.” Science,  pretender to transcendent authority,  was becoming
industrialized, technocratic.
21 David Hollinger has rightly argued that the critical role played by the pragmatists in
American culture was “to find and articulate” a “way of life consistent with what they
and their contemporaries variously perceived as the implications of  modern science”
(Hollinger 1985: 93). It is widely held, by friends and enemies, that they succeeded. On this
interpretation, the pragmatists adopted a view of science in which successful prediction
and control  vindicated inquiry.  By subordinating all  inquiry to “practical  ends,” they
could show that a belief was warranted only insofar as it was “scientific.” Finally, they
could  then vindicate  a  culture  whose  “social  motor”  was  science.  In  what  follows,  I
suggest  that  the  foregoing  interpretation  is  a  stunning  distortion  and  that  the
pragmatists failed utterly in their quest to set a new course for a “scientific” civilization.
Not only were the forces at work resistant to their criticisms,  but their fundamental
insights, in a paradoxical inversion, became absorbed in distorted forms.
22 Peirce,  James and Dewey sought a conception of  philosophy which responded to the
“scientism” of the dominating view of science. Peirce wrote before disciplinary social
science was created and so we will not find anything from him on the topic. But he was
fully  aware  of  work  of  the  philosophers/physicists  who  had  articulately  a  powerful
positivist conception of natural science. And did not like it. The focus here is on his views
of the causal importance of the independently existing world of nature.
 
Peirce’s Pragmatism
23 As everyone knows, what came to be called “pragmatism” was first set out by Peirce in
two remarkable essays published in Popular Science Monthly in 1877-78. In the first, “The
Fixation of Belief,” he put forward his genuinely original “doubt-belief” theory of inquiry,
what I shall take to be the core of “pragmatism.” Insisting that “that sole object of inquiry
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is the settlement of opinion” – not as the tradition had held, the securing of truth, and
that “belief is of the nature of a habit,” he offered that of the possible modes of fixing
belief, while all “do have their merits,” the method of science had, finally, to be the one
we must chose, exactly because the method of science alone “presents any distinction of a
right  and a  wrong way” (108-9).  Its  “fundamental  hypothesis”  is  that  there  are  real
things,  whose characters are entirely independent of  our opinions about them; these
realities affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as
different as our relations to objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception,
we can ascertain by reasoning how things really are (107-8).
24 Peirce  cannot  “prove”  that  there  is  something  “which  affects  or  might  affect  every
[one]”, but “upon which our thinking has no effect.” Yet there is no reason that a genuine
doubt should arise in the practice of the method; indeed, “nobody […] can really doubt
there are realities, or, if he did, doubt would not be a source of dissatisfaction” (Peirce
1950: 108). We can know “how things really are” even if the effects of reality on us “are
necessarily as various as are individual conditions.” We can because we can assume that
there are “regular laws” involved in our transacting with “real things”. Finally, not only
does “everybody use the method,” hesitating only when “he does not know when to apply
it,”  but  “scientific  investigation has had the most wonderful  triumphs in the way of
settling opinion” (108).
25 This enormously rich beginning was followed by “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” the
essay which contains Peirce’s famous “pragmatic maxim.”
26 Peirce illustrated his famous principle by asking if one could say of a diamond that had
been crystalized in the midst of a cushion of cotton and had remained there until it was
burned up, whether it was really hard? The issue was not merely whether unscratched
diamonds are hard, but more generally, there was the question of that Reality which he
had posited as so essential to the method of science. When Peirce applied his principle to
the meaning of “the real,” he was led, as everyone knows, to assert that “the opinion
which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is what we mean by the
truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real” (133). Against himself, he
asked whether this was consistent with the definition given in his fixation essay? Did it
not, in idealist fashion, make “the characters of the real depend upon what is ultimately
thought  about  them.”  He  answered  that  “reality  is  independent,  not  necessarily  of
thought in general, but only of what you or I or any finite number of men may think
about it” (133).
27 But  if  “the  real”  is  to  provide  a  constraint  on  current  belief  adequate  for  epistemic
purposes, will this do? In The Monist of 1905, he returned to these problems. In the first of
two essays,  he made clear that  “instead of  merely jeering at  metaphysics,  like other
prope-positivists, the pragmaticist extracts from it a precious essence, which will serve to
give life to cosmology and physics” (Peirce 1950: 192). This “precious essence” was his
“scholastic  realism”  –  and  precious  it  indeed  was.  But  if  pragmatism  was  “prope-
positivist,” what did this mean? Peirce was as emphatic about his scholastic realism as he
was emphatic about what for him was the real novelty of the new pragmatic theory: “its
recognition  of  an  inseparable  connection  between  rational  cognition  and  rational
purpose,” the connection which James will be so pleased to develop.
28 Whatever  Peirce  intended  by  his  scholastic  realism,  it  is  clear  enough  that  it  is
inconsistent with all the positivisms, Comte’s, Mill’s,  Mach’s or later Vienna varieties.
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While for Peirce, there was a “non-experienceable reality” – in this he agreed with Kant –
“there  are  real  objects  that  are  general,  among  the  number  being  the  modes  of
determination of  existent singulars.” The article of  1878 had either glossed over this
point  as  “unsuited” to the public  there addressed or,  he noted,  “perhaps the author
wavered in his own mind” (215). In that essay, he had written: “it would be merely a
question of nomenclature whether that diamond should be said to have been hard or
not.” This is, he now writes, no doubt true, “except for the abominable falsehood in the
word ‘merely,’ implying that symbols are unreal.” “Nomenclature involves classification,”
he continued, “and classification is true or false.” Thus, “the generals to which it refers
are either reals […] or figments” (215). In this case, the “generals” are real: 
There are diamonds and anything which is really a diamond is really hard because
being hard is an inseparable property of at least some of those other properties
which make a diamond what it really is. It must be hard. (219)
29 The point must not be missed. On positivist versions, laws of nature are construed as
universal conditionals of the form (x) (Fx→Gx) where ‘→’ is “suitably” interpreted. That
is, a law is construed as a contingent relationship between the extensions of its terms, “all
F’s are G’s.” But on Peirce’s view of the matter, a law expresses a nomic relationship
between  properties,  between  F-ness  and  G-ness,  properties  to  which  we  refer  with
corresponding abstract terms. The reality of the diamond is expressed in the truth of
“general conditional propositions,” but these are not construed in a Humean fashion, for
as Peirce saw (and Kant before him), on such a view, science is not possible.
30 In an unpublished manuscript, “Laws of Nature and Hume” (1901), Peirce’s criticism of
Hume (and the Humeans) is decisive. He writes:
we do not say that the alternation of day and night is necessary, because it depends
upon the circumstance that the earth continually rotates. But we do say that by
virtue  of  gravity  every  body  near  the  surface  of  the  earth  must  be  continually
receiving a component downward acceleration […] Nor do Hume or his followers
dream of denying that. But what they mean when they say there is not “necessity”
in gravitation is that every “event” which gravitation formulates is in reality totally
independent  of  every  other;  just  as  Hume  supposes  the  different  instances  of
induction to be independent “evidences.” One stone’s falling has no real connection
with another’s fall […] The objection to Hume’s conception of a Law of Nature is
that it supposes the universe to be utterly unintelligible, while, in truth, the only
warrant for any hypothesis must be that it renders phenomena intelligible. (Peirce
1950: 310)
31 Science  needs  real  connectedness;  but  such  connectedness  is  not  the  product  of
constitutive  features  of  the  mind,  as Kant  had  it.  Connectedness  is  in  the  mind-
independent  world.  It  is  thus  that  for  Peirce,  there  are  “objective  possibilities,”
unactualized,  but  real.  And thus  also  that  for Peirce’s  pragmatism,  intelligibility,  not 
prediction is the only warrant for a hypothesis.
 
James’ Psychology and Philosophy of Science
32 James’s Principles  is perhaps one of the two or three greatest books in the history of
psychology. Yet contrary to the conventional wisdom, it had practically no influence on
the  development  of  American  psychology.12 We  can  notice,  first,  that  Principles  was
published when the subject-matter and method of psychology as a science were still very
much unsettled (Manicas 1987, Chapter 9).
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33 James offered, modestly and misleadingly, that the originality of his Principles consisted in
its “strictly positivist [– scientific! –] point of view” (James 1981, vol. 1: 6). It is important
first to see what James did not mean by this. Indeed, James’s critical realist understanding
of science, like Peirce’s, stands in direct opposition to the positivist philosophy of science
then so powerfully in vogue.
34 He was clear that the results of scientific inquiry were in no way the “immediate results
of experience” nor were “scientific objects” restricted to what is found in experience.
Thus, “the essence of things for science is not to be what they seem, but to be atoms and
molecules  moving  to  and  from  each  other  according  to  strange  laws  […]  What  we
experience, what comes before us, is a chaos of fragmentary impressions interrupting each
other; what we think is an abstract system of hypothetical data and laws” (1981, Vol. II:
1230-1).
35 Plainly, we do something with “what comes before us.” But there are two aspects of this.
There is first what we all do if we are to have coherent experience, if we are to convert
“the chaos of fragmentary impressions” to a grasp of the “habitudes of concrete things.”
The grasp of these, the “proximate laws of nature,” for example, that heat melts ice and
salt  preserves  meat,  form  “an  enormous  part  of  human  wisdom.”  These  “empirical
truths” are “practical.” Indeed, they are indispensable to the continued reproduction of
human communities. In James’s view, getting an understanding of how we come to have
such knowledge was the first problem for a scientific psychology. But there is, as well,
what as scientists we do: The effort to explain these “proximate laws” by means of theories
which, for example, speak of polemerization or gravitation. For James, following Peirce,
such  theories  have  an  entirely  different  aim and  ground.  “The  popular  notion  that
‘Science’ is forced on the mind ab extra, and that our interests have nothing to do with its
constructions,  is  utterly  absurd.”  But  James  emphatically  denied  that  the  “interest”
which generates science is  “practical.” Picking up a theme he had advanced in “The
Sentiment of Rationality,” he insisted that “the craving to believe that the things of the
world belong to kinds which are related by an inward rationality together, is the parent
of Science as well as of sentimental philosophy.” Moreover, “the original investigator
always preserves a healthy sense of how plastic the materials are in his hands” (1260).
36 Scientific inquiry might yield technologies, but James was clear that this was neither its
motivation nor its vindication, a point made by Peirce that Veblen put to such good work
in his “The Place of Science in Modern Civilization.” In contrast to the “proximate laws of
nature,” scientific theories have to harmonize with the “proximate laws of nature,” yet
they are tested not in the course of everyday experience, but in “artificial experiments in
the laboratory.” James seems to see that, in order to set up an experiment, we need to
“conjecture” that there is some unobservable mechanism whose processes have predicted
effects.  We  contrive  the  experiment,  then,  so  as  to  eliminate  conditions  that,  in
uncontrolled  common experience,  would  interfere  with  its  uncomplicated  operation.
That is,  uncritical  “experience,” in Baconian fashion, does not “engender” the “inner
relations.” Rather, in experimentation, we generate experiences which give us evidence of
the reality postulated by the theory.
37 Accordingly, what is pertinent to defining success will differ as well. Practical purposes
offer  practical  tests;  the  interests  of  theoretic  rationality,  the  “constructions”  which
bring “a strong feeling of ease, peace, rest,” the “lively relief” which comes with “rational
comprehension”,  answer  to  “the  aesthetic  Principle  of  Ease”  (James  1978:  35),  what
Veblen termed, “the test of dramatic consistency.” This is hardly an expression of the
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crude “cash value” pragmatism so frequently attributed to James and more generally to
pragmatism!
38 In Principles, James’s selected example is a long text from Helmholtz’s Die Efhaltung der
Kraft. Helmholtz had it right:
Theoretical science tries to discover the unknown causes of processes from their
visible effects; tries to understand them by the law of causality […] The ultimate
goal of theoretical physics is to find the last unchanging causes of the processes of
nature. (1981 II: 1261)
39 To be sure, James gave this a novel twist: “What makes the assumption [of unchanging
causes] ‘scientific’ and not merely poetic, what makes a Helmholtz and his kin discoverers, 
is that the things of Nature turn out to act as if they were of the kind assumed” (1261). 
Over metaphysics, aesthetics and moral philosophy, science has an advantage:
Though  nature’s  materials  lend  themselves  slowly  and  discouragingly  to  our
translation of them into ethical forms; but more readily into aesthetic forms; to
translation  into  scientific  forms  they  lend  themselves  with  relative  ease  and
completeness.  The  translation,  it  is  true,  will  probably  never  be  ended.  The
perceptive order does not give way, nor the right conceptive substitute for it arise
at our bare word of command. It is often a deadly fight. (1981 II: 1236)
40 This  is  perhaps  the  basis  of  James’s  most  profound ethical  claim,  repeated in  many
different formulations, that “the inmost nature of […] reality is congenial to powers which
[we] possess.” Moreover, saying that “the translation […] will probably never be ended”
suggests that James would reject, as I think he should, the Peircean notion that in the
end, there will be some one true “description” that is the product of persistent inquiry.
Indeed, this would seem to be the case, as well, as regards ethical and aesthetic matters.
Yet,  the belief  that  there are “atoms and molecules moving to and from each other
according to strange laws” is a belief about the nature of a hidden reality. Indeed, in his
notes for the 1879 “The Sentiment of Rationality,” there is a brilliant argument for the
pragmatic pertinence of the idea of a non-experienceable reality. James says:
The principle of “pragmatism” which allows for all assumptions to be of identical
value so long as they equally save the appearances will of course be satisfied by this
empiricist explanation […] [viz.], as according to Mill, that no mysterious “outness”
needs to be postulated]. But common sense is not assuaged. She says, yes, I get all
the particulars, am cheated out of none of my expectations. And yet the principle of
intelligibility  is  gone.  Real  outness  makes  everything  simple  as  the  day,  but  the
troops of ideas marching and falling perpetually into order, which you now ask me
to adopt, have no reason in them – their whole existence is de facto and not de jure. 
(James, 1978: 374)
41 Nevertheless, if British phenomenalism did not suffice, neither could he accept a “more”
beyond the actual as it functioned in Spencer and Kant. Appealing to Peirce’s arguments,
he first notes that “most scientific readers of Spencer wholly fail to catch the destructive
import of his theory […] They are willing to believe with the Master that the deepest
reality is the absolutely irrational, because that reality is unknowable, but few of them
ultimately realize that the knowable of their philosophy forms a world of Chance pure
and simple” (1978: 369). Spencer’s “unknowable” cannot function to give order, since to
do  this  it  must  be  known  to  have  properties  which  could  explain  the  orderliness  of
experience. It was thus that the “plus ultra in many philosophies – in Mr Spencer’s and in
Kant’s e.g., the noumenon is a dog in the manger, it does nothing for us itself but merely
stands and blasts with its breath the actual” (371).
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42 James was haunted by the apparent intractability of making sense of a relation between
“outer” and “inner,” between mental facts and facts in the world independent of mind. At
this point at least, none of the inherited forms of phenomenalism would suffice, even if
with it he would later change his mind. James agreed here with Peirce that the real could
not be reduced to the actual: “There are still other forces at work in the mind which lead
it to suppose something over and above the mere actuality of things.” These include “the
sense  of  futurity,  the  power  of  expectation”  and  our  moral  judgments,  which  “also
involve […] the notion of something related to the instant representation and yet lying
beyond its mere actuality” (369-70).
43 The “Sentiment of Rationality” is important in another way. In holding that “conceptions,
‘kinds’  are  teleological  instruments,”  serving the  needs  of  “theoretic  rationality,”  he
hinted at an utterly novel solution to some age-old problems, problems given a full-blown
naturalistic treatment in Principles. On this view, classification, judging and predicating
presuppose  “a  rather  intricate  system  of  necessary  and  immutable  ideal  truths  of
comparison.” The “empiricists” are wrong in supposing that necessary truths are merely
the result of “experience” or as Spencer had it, of “mere paths of ‘frequent’ association
which outer stimuli […] ploughed” into the brain. But the apriorists are also wrong since
the “eternal verities” which “our mind lays hold of do not necessarily themselves lay hold
on extra-mental being, nor have they, as Kant pretended later, a legislating character
even for  all  possible experience.”  Rooted “in the inner forces  which make the brain
grow,”  and  therefore  not  transcendental,  they  can  be  given  a  wholly  naturalistic
explanation. Moreover, psychology shows that classification is functional in the sense
that  essential  attributes  are  nothing  more  than  abstracted  properties  which  serve
inference.
44 It is not surprising, accordingly, that if Mill et al. “begin with a clear nominalist note, they
are sure to end with a grating rattle which sounds very like universalia in re, if not ante rem
” (James 1978: 49). As Peirce had already insisted, if “particulars” are wholly independent,
inference is impossible. But on James’s view, Peirce’s “generals” did not need to have
ontological status, either ante rem or in re. “The only meaning of essence is teleological […]
classification and conception are purely teleological weapons of the mind” (1981, II: 961).
45 Yet it is critical to see also that James’s “pragmatic” account presupposes – as he sees –
that there are relatively enduring “things,” that “the world” which is independent of
mind is not Heraclitean: “This world might be a world in which all things differed, and in
which what properties there were ultimate and had not farther predicates.” Fortunately,
our world “plays right into logic’s hands. Some of the things […] are of the same kind as
other things; some of them remain always of the kind which they once were; and some of
the properties  of  them cohere indissolubly and are always found together” (1981,  II:
1246-7). That is, as Peirce had insisted, the “objects” of the external world have some
“character” or other, even though they need not be self-identifying to be cognized. If they
are not self-identifying, however, the way they got identified can be largely a function of
human purposes, generically understood. H2O is not “more deeply and truly” the essence of
water than it is “a solvent of sugar or a slaker of thirst” – since, as Dewey would later
insist,  “it  is  all  of  these  things  with equal  reality”  (II,  961,  note).  Still,  for  scientific
purposes,  H2O  is  primary,  exactly  because  the  scientific  interest  is  “the  interest  of
theoretic rationality.”
46 The foregoing shows, I believe, that James offered a powerful philosophy of science which
was not vulnerable to the difficulties in Peirce’s more speculative view. And it was not a
American Social Science
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, III-2 | 2011
10
positivism: “All ages have their intellectual populace. That of our own day prides itself
particularly on its love of Science and Facts and its contempt for all metaphysics” (1978:
56).  Positivists  fool  themselves  if  they suppose that  they dispense with metaphysics.
Indeed, “Metaphysics of some sort there must be. The only alternative is between the
good  Metaphysics  of  clear-headed  Philosophy  and  the  trashy  Metaphysics  of  vulgar
Positivism” (57).  James’s philosophy of science – in many ways akin to contemporary
critical realism, was no “trashy metaphysics of vulgar Positivism.”13
47 But James believed that his Principles had failed to solve the mystery of knowing (James
1894), and, remarkably, after struggling for some twelve years to write his great book,
James concluded that it was “a loathsome, distended, tumified, bloated dropsical mass,
testifying  to  nothing  but  two facts:  1st,  that  there  is  no  such thing  as  a  science  of
psychology, and 2nd, that W. J. is an incapable.”14
48 We must dismiss James’s self-deprecation. But could he be right: There is no such thing as
a science of psychology? This was, be sure, the last thing that the heirs of Wundt, the
functionalists and behaviorists wanted to hear. The long-lived Dewey was at the founding
of disciplinary psychology, but unlike James, he was in continuous dialogue with what it
was to become. After Watson, Dewey seems to have lost all hope that psychology could
become what he had hoped for. Indeed, he would find what he had hoped for in his Logic.
 
Dewey and the Origins of American Psychology
49 One of  Dewey’s  earliest  essays  was  an examination of  “The New Psychology” (1884).
Historians agree that “the new psychology” derived from Wilhelm Wundt who founded
the  first  psychological  laboratory  in  1879  and  whose  Grundzuge  der  physiologische
Psychologie  (1st  Edition,  1873)  was an enormous success.  But Wundt’s  psychology was
complicated and offered many not always clearly consistent strands. But, according to
Dewey, advances in the biological sciences have had another direct effect on the new
psychology:
To biology is due the conception of organism […] In psychology this conception has
led  to  the  recognition  of  mental  life  as  an  organic  unitary  process  developing
according to the laws of all life, and not a theater for the exhibition of independent
autonomous faculties, or a rendez-vous in which isolated, atomic sensations and
ideas may gather, hold external converse and then forever part. (EW 1: 56)
50 This, of course, is directed at British-style associationist psychology, but as part of this,
Dewey, still the Hegelian, endorses an ecological conception and the Wundtian premise
that mind is social. Thus, “the idea of environment is a necessity to the idea of organism,
and with the conception of environment comes the impossibility of considering psychical
life as an individual, isolated thing, developing in vacuum” (ibid.).
51 But there is more. As a “movement,” the new psychology has certain general features:
“The chief characteristic distinguishing it from the old psychology is undoubtedly the
rejection of a formal logic as a method and test. The old psychologists almost without
exception held to a  nominalist  logic” (58), a  pronounced tendency,  especially among
those “who proclaimed that ‘experience’ was the sole source of all knowledge” (59). Hume
destroyed all relations except as “accidents” and “denied all universality”. But he did this
on the basis of “purely logical models,” “abstract principles of difference and identity […]
put in the guise of psychological expression.” The reaction to this, as in Kant, was to “fall
back  on certain  ultimate,  indecomposable,  necessary first  truths  immediately  known
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through some mysterious faculty of mind […] Such intuitions are not psychological; they
are conceptions bodily imported from the logical sphere” (ibid.). These criticisms of the
prevailing alternatives are, of course, familiar Deweyan themes, and indeed, they hold
against a wide variety of empiricisms from Quine to contemporary AI theory.
52 Dewey’s  hopes  for  “the new psychology” were not  restricted to  psychology only;  he
believed  that  it  held  enormous  promise  for  philosophy  itself.  To  be  sure,  not  any
psychology will  do.  Dewey’s  first  effort  was his  1886 Psychology,  published four years
before James’s Principles of Psychology. Dewey intended the book to be an introductory text
in psychology, but wanted also that it be an introduction to philosophy. In “Kant and
Philosophic Method” (1884), Dewey challenged the “method of ‘intellectualism’ begun by
Descartes”  (EW:  1:  34)  and he  argued,  as  before,  that  Humeans,  avowedly  empirical,
distorted experience. Kant’s attempted repair had failed:
Though the categories make experience, they make it out of foreign material […]
They constitute objects, but these objects are not such in universal reference, but
only  to  beings  of  like  capacities  of  receptivity  as  ourselves.  They  respect  not
existence in itself, but ourselves as affected by that existence. (39)
53 Again, “the only conception adequate to experience as a whole is organism,” a conception
which Dewey found in Hegel’s Logic (42, 43).
54 Before  the  century  ended,  Dewey  did  become  uncomfortable  with  his  Hegelianism,
abandoning it for the variety of naturalism which now so strongly identifies him, but it is
essential to see that while he abandoned Hegel and psychology, he never did abandon the
seminal psychological insights that his Hegelianism afforded.
 
Pragmatism and Functionalism
55 In  all  the  standard  histories,  “functionalism,”  the  distinctive  American  psychology,
figures heavily in subsequent development. Moreover, the “pragmatists” figure heavily in
the development of “functionalism,” from its beginnings in Chicago to its variant forms
elsewhere.  In these histories,  the path from “functionalism” to “behaviorism” is  less
clear, even if Dewey, as the mentor to Angell, Watson’s dissertation supervisor and the
premier  functionalist,  remains  in  the  fuzzy  background.  Returning  in  1950  to  his
remarkable 1929 History, Boring could note that “Watson was a functionalist (with a small
f) but he could not tolerate for long the requirement of the Chicago school that even the
animal psychologist must take time to translate [sic] positively observed behavior into the
vague terms of an inferred consciousness” (1950: 641). Indeed, with this not so subtle
erasure of differences between pragmatism and positivism, Boring could conclude that
“[operationism] was there all along,” recognized well before Percy Bridgman and Vienna
positivism as an “advance” by American psychologists (1950: 656).
56 With  Watson’s  behaviorism,  scientific  psychology  had  not  only  expunged  all  talk  of
“consciousness,” but indeed had become a technocratic science of prediction and control.
Considering the stereotypes of American pragmatism, its talk of the “cash value” of ideas,
and  Dewey’s  association  with  Progressive  political  and  social  theory,  it  is  easy  to
understand his  taken-for-granted role  in  this  development,  especially  when his  1896
essay, “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology” is taken, remarkably, to be “one of the
most  important  arguments  for  the  functional  attitude  toward  the  interactions  (sic)
between stimulus and response” (Hilgard 1987: 81) and, even more remarkably, when we
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notice that in 1943, this paper “was chosen as one of the most important articles ever
published in Psychological Review” (Leahy 1992: 282).
 
Dewey’s 1896 Essay on the Reflex Arc
57 But  the  critical  point  is  the  failure  to  recognize  the  philosophical  background  and
fundamental point of Dewey’s famous essay on the reflex arc. It is true and important to
recognize that between perhaps 1891 and 1903, with the Studies in Logical Theory, Dewey
had made a conversion to his distinctive version of naturalism. But it is equally true and
important that this was a naturalism that carried a huge Hegelian residue. Flower and
Murphey say it well:
It is almost as if Dewey held off from naturalism until he should be able to integrate
with it those aspects of idealism which he regarded as philosophically important:
the view of knowledge as organic and relational, the social character of both self
and knowledge, the unifying and purposive character of judgment. Dewey could not
bring together those features with naturalism as long as the dominant model of the
latter was atomistic. (Flower & Murphey 1977: 820)
58 This is was precisely the burden of the reflex arc essay. Dewey acknowledged that “the
idea of a reflex arc has upon the whole come nearer to meeting the demand for a general
working hypothesis than any other concept” (EW: 5: 96) and his essay is not intended “to
make a plea for what it replaced.” But the new account, best intentions notwithstanding,
suffered from all the features of the older account. “The dualism between sensation and
idea  is  repeated  in  the  current  dualism  of  peripheral  and  central  structures  and
functions; the older dualism of body and soul finds a distinct echo in the current dualism
of stimulus and response” (ibid.). Thus, “the sensory stimulus is one thing, the central
activity, standing for the idea, is another thing, and the motor discharge, standing for the
act proper, is a third.” But if so, is it impossible to see how action can be thought-guided
or how we can learn? Experience shows not only that we do, but also what is amiss: the
reflex arc is not “a patchwork of disjointed parts, a mechanical conjunction of unallied
processes.” It was not to be understood “mechanically” but “functionally.” Rather, it is “a
comprehensive or organic unity” (97). Dewey could now reject mechanism and atomism
from a fully naturalistic point of view.
59 While for Dewey intentionality is a fundamental feature of all learning, he surely has not
given us any account that provides the mechanisms for this. It will surely be a messy
psychology including as it  does a revisioning of  the role and relationships of  all  the
critical  elements.  But  it  is  a  naturalistic  program which  rejects  all  the  mainstream
versions of psychology.15
 
“Scientism” and “Scientific Psychology”
60 In the ensuing years, “stimulus” will be employed to suit nearly any purpose, from a
physical input or physiological event to, incoherently, “a situation or an involved object
with meaning encrusted on it” (Boring 1929: 586). All of this, to be sure, was “scientific”
defined exactly in positivist terms. Thus, propelled and legitimated by the wedding of
traditional  Humean  empiricism and  the  extensionalist  logic  of  Principia  Mathematica,
logical  positivism  could  vindicate  the  so-called  “Age  of  Theory.”  With  “intervening
variables” and “hypothetical constructs, S-R psychology could even offer gestures in the
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way of central  processes.  It  seems unlikely that those who judged Dewey’s reflex-arc
essay to be one of “the most important articles ever published in Psychological Review”
could have understood Dewey’s paper. We can note also that Watson fully admitted being
perplexed by Dewey. Although he had been drawn to Chicago to study with Dewey, in his
autobiography  Watson  wrote:  “I  never  knew  what  he  was  talking  about  then,  and
unfortunately for me, I still don’t know” (cited by Fancher 1979: 316). Indeed, the example
attests, by this time, to the hegemonic standing of logical empiricism among “scientific”
true believers!
61 After the mid 1890s, Dewey wrote nearly nothing that could be said to find a place in the
emerging discipline of  American psychology.  Several reviews give us some additional
insight into why this was so. His 1898 review of Baldwin’s Social and Ethical Interpretations
of Mental Development, offers a critical distinction: between examining the individual from
the standpoint of psychical process and determining what of this is social, and examining
not the process but the content of the individual’s experience to discover what this has in
common with others (EW 5: 385-6). For Dewey, the first belongs to psychology, the second
to sociology.  Baldwin confuses these question because he falls  into a trap:  Both “the
individual” and “the society” are taken as given. Accordingly, “when we want to know
about the individual we are referred to society; when we want to know about society we
are referred to the individual” (388).
62 Dewey should not have been disappointed. Indeed, just three years earlier, in a paper
read  at  a  joint  session  of  the  American  Philosophical  and  American  Psychological
Associations on “The Standpoint and Method of Psychology,” he expressed fears about
the  direction of  “the  behavioristic  movement.”  It  was  quite  one  thing  to  throw out
“consciousness” as private and open only to introspection. It was quite another thing to
throw out “mind” in the sense just noted. “To conceive behavior exclusively in terms of
the changes ongoing on within an organism physically  separate in space from other
organisms is to continue that conception of mind which Professor Perry has well termed,
‘subcutaneous’” (MW: 7: 54). His criticisms paralleled those made against S-R psychology:
“In  so  far  as  behaviorists  tend  to  ignore  the  social  qualities  of  behavior,  they  are
perpetuating exactly the tradition against which they are nominally protesting” (54).
 
Dewey and Academic Social Science
63 Dewey said very little about the social sciences and although one finds throughout the
corpus,  references  to  science,  one  finds  little  in  the  way of  a  systematic  account  of
science. Most of the terms descriptive of science and in general use were – and are –
vague  and  uncritically  employed:  for  example,  cause,  law,  theory,  explanation  and
experimental method. Dewey, like most writers today, could take these terms for granted
even if, as I would insist, one can get contradictory conceptions of science from different
analyses of them. This unclarity should not surprise us.  What we now think of as an
important subdiscipline of philosophy, philosophy of science, emerged only in the 1950s
and it is only in the 1970s that there has been a genuine competitor to the positivist
interpretation of science.
64 Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, published in 1938, is surely the main exception to the overall
absence of texts on Dewey’s theory of science. What is there is very important, but there
are many important questions which Dewey did not address and, typically, he does not
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make  effort  to  place  his  work  in  the  context  of  other  writers  on  science,  Vienna
positivism, for example. When the Logic was published, as Ralph Sleeper has argued, it
was both ignored and misunderstood, so thoroughgoing were entrenched assumptions
about logic and science. Moreover, by this time, systematic misunderstanding of Dewey
was  also  well-entrenched.  Accordingly,  it  was  not  then,  and  is  not  now,  a  genuine
competitor for the received views of logic and science.
 
Dewey’s Rejection of the Epistemological Problem
65 Modern  philosophy,  responding  to  the  new  science,  has  been  haunted  by  “the
epistemological problem,” the problem of justifying true belief. Dewey, following Peirce
and James, rejected the assumptions which generated the problem, a defining feature of
pragmatism. Thus, inquiry begins with genuine doubt and ends when doubt has been
overcome. In every case, whether in the sciences or the problem solving of ordinary life,
the settling of belief begins with a clear definition of the concrete problem, an assembling
of all the materials, intellectual and material, and then action which either settles the
doubt or does not. Dewey’s philosophy is a praxis philosophy in just this sense. Failure to
see this has misled many otherwise astute commentators.  Dorothy Ross,  for example,
singles out Dewey’s (1897) lecture, “The Significance of the Problem of Knowledge” as a
critical intervention on the side of the technocrats. But this is far from being the case: Its
thrust is  against traditional foundationist epistemology:  rationalist,  sensationalist  and
Kantian. Dewey writes:
Knowledge can define the percept and elaborate the concept, but their union can be
found only in action. The experimental method of modern science, its erection into
the ultimate mode of verification, is simply this fact obtaining recognition. (EW 5:
21)
66 Contrary to the epistemologists, there is no problem of knowledge in general: philosophy
is “not an original fountainhead of truth.” And this means that for answers to questions
about  how knowledge is  possible  we need to  look to  psychology and social  ethics  –
“including in the latter term all the related concrete social sciences, so far as they may
give guidance to conduct” (22). Dewey’s project was to naturalize epistemology and moral
theory.
The sociologist, like the psychologist, often presents himself as a camp follower of
genuine science and philosophy, picking up scraps here and there and piecing them
together in somewhat aimless fashion […] But social ethics represents the attempt
to  translate  philosophy  from  a  general  and  therefore  abstract  method  into  a
working and specific method; it is the change from inquiring into the nature of
value in general to an inquiry of the particular values which ought to be realized in
the  life  of  everyone,  and  of  the  conditions  which  shall  render  possible  this
realization. (23)
67 This is a stunning research program for social science, stunningly ignored. We need to be
clear  about  this.  Dewey  believed,  rightly,  that  human  sciences  could  help  us  to
understand ourselves: how we think and inquire and why, when thinking and inquiry is
successful,  it  is  successful.  They  would  give  us  insight  into  what  were  our  genuine
interests and purposes and their relations, and most obviously, they would give us an
understanding of the obstacles in present arrangements that keep us from realizing our
genuine  interests  and  purposes.  The  human  sciences  would  be  a  “social  motor,”
emancipating in exactly  the sense that  they would clear  away misconceptions  about
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ourselves and our arrangements and empower us to reconstruct the social world more in
accordance with our wants and aims.
68 Central to this project was the rejection of the bifurcation of fact and value, a further
consequence  of  the  mistaken  assumptions  that  had  generated  “the  epistemological
problem.” In his Logic, Dewey argued that “most current social inquiry” was marked by
“the separation of theory and practice” (LW 12: 487). It is sound principle, Dewey says,
that one should avoid making social judgments “on the ground of moral preconceptions,
conceptions of what is right and wrong, vicious and virtuous” (489). But this is mistakenly
converted to the principle that one should make no evaluations about ends. But “only
recognition in both theory and practice that ends to be attained (ends-in-view) are of the
nature  of  hypotheses  and  that  hypotheses  have  to  be  formed  and  tested  in  strict
correlativity with existential conditions as means, can alter current habits of dealing with
social issues” (491).
69 Moreover, it is easy to assume that “the problems which exist are already definite in their
main features.”  The  result  is  that  “methods  for  resolving  problematic  situations  are
proposed without any clear conception of the material in which projects are to be applied
and to take effect,” with often a worsening of the situation which generated the inquiry
(LW 12: 487). The analogy between current modes of inquiry in social science and pre-
scientific medicine was apt. As Dewey noted elsewhere, such practice was a combination
of empiricism and quackery: Without analysis, symptoms were responded to in terms of
handed down remedies. Of course, these sometimes worked. But as regards medicine at
least, “it is now recognized that choice of remedial measures looking to restoration of
health is haphazard until the conditions which constitute the trouble or disease have
been determined as completely and accurately as possible” (488).
70 The self-imposed constraints  of  “allegedly  scientific  social  inquiry”  also  explains  the
positivist penchant for “fact-gathering.” Dewey had attacked this idea in his 1931 essay,
“Social Science and Social Control.” Dewey offered that “the existing limitations of ‘social
science’ (Dewey’s quotation marks) are due mainly to unreasoning devotion to physical
science as a model, and to a misconception of physical science at that” (LW 6: 64). In the
Logic, Dewey held that methods adopted “in the professed name of social science” are
merely the form of genuine science since they fail  “to observe the logical conditions
which in physical science give the techniques of observing and measuring their standing
and force” (LW 12: 492).  There are many places where Dewey assessed current social
science as deficient. In this essay (as in the Logic), Dewey held: “[T]he facts of social ‘fact-
finding’ remain a miscellaneous pile of meaningless items.” “Since their connections with
human wants and their effect on human values are neglected, there is nothing which
binds them together into an intelligible whole” (LW 6: 65).
71 Indeed, in a related section of the Logic, Dewey developed an argument that C. W. Mills
will pick up in his 1959 Sociological Imagination. Dewey saw two one-sided distortions. The
“positivist” school (his term!) singlemindedly directs itself as “fact-finding” – what Mills
had  called  “abstracted  empiricism.”  But  the  opposing  tendency  “places  its  entire
emphasis on conceptions” (LW 12: 497) – what Mills called “Grand Theory.” As with Mills,
“facts are subsumed directly under ‘principles,’ the latter being regarded as fixed norms
that decide the legitimacy or illegitimacy of existing phenomena and that prescribe the
end toward which endeavor should be directed” (497).
 
American Social Science
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, III-2 | 2011
16
Instrumentalism and Science
72 Dewey’s commitments to scientific method, his persistent attacks on inquiry detached
from human concerns and his  extensive use of  technological  metaphors have caused
enormous confusion, but Hickman wisely glosses Dewey’s “instrumentalism” by arguing
that “Dewey goes beyond theory and beyond praxis to production: his concern is with the
making and testing of new entities including extra-organic tools as well  as goals and
ideals” (15). “Science” in this sense is a more refined and developed form of all inquiry.
Thus, in the Logic, Dewey insists that ”there is no sharp dividing line between common
sense and science. “Control” – as Hickman says, a synonym for knowledge – does not
refer to the subordination or domination of something. Rather, as Dewey makes clear
enough, “control” refers to our capacity to apply intelligence successfully: to produce,
adapt,  adjust,  accommodate,  achieve,  institute,  identify,  order,  discriminate,  and  to
“resolve” problems in many other sorts of ways. “Control” has been achieved when the
problem which generated inquiry has been resolved.
73 It is in this sense, also, that “practical” must be understood. These “technical processes
and instrumentalities” then become “the background of materials and operations which
we term science” (LW 12: 77). And, indeed,
Genuine  scientific  knowledge  revived  when  inquiry  adopted  as  part  of  its  own
procedure and for  its  own purpose the previously disregarded instrumentalities
and procedures of productive workers. This adoption is the radical characteristic of
the experimental method of science. (LW 12: 99, 388-9)
74 But this does entail a collapse of science into technology in the sense that all inquiry has
some immediate practical aim and surely not in the sense that we can and should seek to
dominate  nature.  All  knowing  is  technological  in  the  sense  that  if  the  problematic
situation is to be brought under “control,” language, mathematics and/or artifacts of
various kinds are required. Indeed, more generally, this is consequence of Dewey’s attack
on the “spectator theory of knowledge.” But the difference between science and common
sense is exactly that while commonsense inquiry “occurs for the sake of settlement of
some issue of use and enjoyment,” scientific inquiry occurs “for its own sake” (LW 12:
66-7.)
75 Dewey’s position here is almost always overlooked. Dewey did not reject the (Greek) idea
that inquiry could be aimed solely at understanding. He rejected the bifurcation of theory
and practice, the idea that one could understand anything without “tools” and without
“experimental operations, involving definite techniques” (LW 12: 151, 420, 455). We need
here to notice that  the continuity between science and commonsense creates  a  very
special burden for social science. Cultural conditions impact all inquiry – a critical point
for  an  anti-positivist  sociology  of  science,  but  because  “the  physical”  is  “relatively
independent of social  issues,” “the influence of cultural conditions” is “indirect.” For
example, “it is not possible […] to separate nineteenth century devotion to exclusively
mechanical conceptions from the needs of industry of that period.” In social science, by
contrast, “prejudices of race, nationality, class and sect play such an important role that
their  influence is  seen by any observer of  the field” (LW 12:  482).  For Dewey,  as  for
contemporary anti-positivists, this called for a self-conscience reflexivity.
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Scientific Laws and Causality
76 Critical to any understanding of science is the conception of law and causality.  First,
Dewey rejected the most characteristic, even defining features of empiricist philosophy of
science: that “scientific laws are formulations of uniform and unconditional sequences of
events,” and that causality must be defined in terms of such sequences (LW 12: 437). Of all
the doctrines which currently inform mainstream social  science,  these are surely the
most pernicious. Once accepted, we are committed to an event ontology and a regularity
determinist view of the universe: Whenever this, then that. It is then also easy to assume
a  covering  law  model  of  explanation,  and  thus  to  hold  also  that  prediction  and
explanation are  symmetrical.  One final  consequence  is  the  inability  to  conceptualize
agency: the fact that persons make things happen. But as Dewey rightly sees, “there are
no such things as uniform sequences of events” (LW 12: 445).
77 Second, he argued that “atoms and molecules show a selective bias in their indifferences,
affinities and repulsions to other events” (LW 1: 162). These “selective biases,” he says,
define their “essence,” a term Dewey used without prejudicing his fully processual view
of the universe. But since on a realist view, the “things” of the universe are always related
to  other  “things,”  outcomes  are  never  guaranteed.  Thus,  “iron  as  such  exhibits
characteristics of bias or selective reactions,” but “iron as a genuine constituent of an
organized body acts so as to end to maintain the type of activity of the organism to which
it belongs” (195). In a living organism, it functions not to produce iron-oxide – as it would
in a hinge – but to contribute to metabolism.
78 Moreover such moves are quite consistent with his idea that commonsense inquiry is
continuous with advanced science. Dewey gives some examples: “A good rain will cause
the seeds that have been planted to grow.” The expectations are “explained” by the
unscientific  person by attributing a  power to rain.  The empiricist  disallows this,  but
content with an effort to establish the validity of the expectations, he does not seek to
understand the “power.” The scientific problem is not, as positivists would have it, to
close the system in order to make better predictions. Rather the scientific problem is to
identify what is about the nature of water and of seeds such that a good rain will (ceteris
paribus) cause the seeds to grow. One needs a theory about pertinent causal mechanisms,
not a better analysis of the “variables.”
79 For example,  Ross (1991:  253) holds that Dewey’s “Psychology and Social  Practice” is
another  place  where  he  endorses  technocracy.  Dewey argues  that  the  teacher  has  a
psychological  theory,  like  it  or  not.  “Teachers  tell  you  that  a  child  is  careless  or
inattentive in the same final way that they would tell you that a piece of paper is white.”
But, insists Dewey, it is only through some recognition of attention as a mechanism, some
awareness of the interplay of sensations, images and motor impulses which constitute it
as an objective fact that the teacher can deal effectively with attention as a function”
(139).
80 Dewey’s point is exactly that unless teachers have an understanding of the student as a
psycho-social  being,  all  their  efforts  are  bound  to  be  misdirected,  ineffective,  even
destructive.  It  is only by understanding the psychological “mechanisms” of attention,
memory,  cognition  and  judgment  and  the  social  “mechanisms”  implicated  in  all
experience and behavior that the teacher can cultivate the powers of the student. This is
for Dewey a research program to be satisfied. We are, he says, discussing the question of
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the role of psychological science in education only because “we have as yet made so little
headway” (144).
81 Dewey’s use of the term “mechanisms” here is notable and suggests how far he is from a
regularity determinist view. This is made even clearer in a 1918 essay entitled “A New
Social  Science,”  one  of  the  very  few  places  where  Dewey  explicitly  discusses  social
science. Dewey argues against the idea, inherited from Comte and Spencer – and still very
much current – that “the existing social order is the product of natural laws which are
expounded in a rational, scientific way” (MW 11: 89). Indeed, very much along the lines of
Weber’s criticism of positivist social science, any science which pretends to be more than
a description of the particular forces which are at work and a descriptive tracing of the
particular consequences which they produce, which pretends to discover basic principles
to which social things conform, and inherent laws which ‘explain’ them is, I repeat, sheer
mythology (90).
82 Dewey acknowledged radical contingency in the universe,  a universe which was both
“precarious and stable.” There were uniformities – a consequence of “selective biases”
and there were plenty of surprises, a consequence of the open systematic character of the
world.  But  such a  metaphysic  calls  for  a  historical  and  concrete  social  science.  The
“description of  particular  forces”  at  work are  the  analogue of  the  “selective  biases”
discoverable by physical science. The “particular consequences” which they produce are
not  guaranteed in  advance because  there  is  always  the fact  of  agency working with
materials at hand. There are no “general laws” under which we can subsume and thereby
explain wars,  revolutions or,  for  that  matter,  hurricanes or  the genesis  of  a  species.
Indeed,  all  concrete  events  are  the  product  of  many causes  working  conjointly  (see
Manicas 2006, Chapter 5).
83 Dewey concludes this brief but rich essay by remarking that “there is […] an immense
amount  of  empirical  subject-matter  contained  within  the  confines  of  existing  social
sciences. The only trouble is that it has been ‘framed up’ and betrayed by its mythical and
apologetic  setting”  (MW 11:  91).  He  does  not,  unfortunately,  elaborate  on  this  very
pregnant idea; but there is little doubt that it regards the guiding principles of positivist
social science.
84 The example raises, as well, the question of the relation of democracy to social scientific
knowledge.  For  the  technocrats,  one  “controls”  the  conditions  and gets  “predictable
results.” More, because “experts” have knowledge which the “masses” lack, democracy
must give way.
 
Social Science and Democracy
85 It is easy enough to establish that World War I had a tremendous impact on Dewey and
that one of  the consequences was his  readiness to believe that the war had brought
forward “the more conscious and extensive use of science for communal purposes.” It had
“made it customary to utilize collective knowledge and skill of scientific experts of all
kinds, organizing them for community ends.” The warfare state, remarkably, had laid the
foundations for the Nationalist Liberalism which became the political agenda of Dewey’s
associates at the The New Republic. But when Walter Lippmann, already persuaded of a
technocratic version of social control, published his Phantom Public in 1925, Dewey finally
came to grips with the problem of scientific knowledge and democracy.16
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86 In The Public and Its Problems (1927), Dewey agreed that there were a host of “technical”
questions which could be answered by “experts”: “sanitation, public health, healthful and
adequate  housing,  transportation,  planning  of  cities,  regulation  and  distribution  of
immigrants, selection and management of personnel, right methods of instruction and
preparation  of  competent  teachers,  scientific  adjustment  of  taxation,  efficient
management of  funds and so on“ (LW 2:  313).  But the idea that such knowledge was
sufficient was profoundly in error. Those who hold to such views “ignore forces which
have to be composed and resolved before technical and specialized action can come into
play” (LW 2: 313). The problem is deep: “It is in the first instance the search for conditions
under which the Great Society may become the Great Community” (327). The public is
lost, eclipsed, inchoate, bewildered, caught in a drift which it cannot grasp and therefore
cannot over-come. Indeed, “the prime condition of a democratically organized public is a
kind of knowledge and insight which does not exist” (339). Citizens needed to understand
what was happening and why. Some technical knowledge was needed, to be sure, but in
the absence of a widely shared understanding of the “forces” at work, no democratic
public could emerge.
87 Dewey is not as radical as he might be in assigning the causes of this. Put aside here the
problems of  distributing “the kind of  knowledge which does not exist,” for example,
problems of the corporate control of mass communication, and concentrate here on the
role of the social sciences themselves. In particular, while he acknowledges the limits of
the special sciences in generating such knowledge, he does not seem to see that they
contribute  mightily  to  the  mystification  of  what  needs  to  be  known.  Instead  of
illuminating  and  emancipating,  too  much  contemporary  social  science  obscures  and
misleads.
88 Dewey gets his hands on some of the reasons for this. He notes that the ”backwardness of
social knowledge is marked in its division into independent and insulated branches of
learning” (171).  This  point,  versus  disciplinary social  science is  never  noticed and is
critical.17 But  this  is  more  than  a  “mark”  of  its  “backwardness”:  It  guarantees
backwardness.  It  is  not  merely,  as  he  says,  that  there  is  lacking  “continuous  cross-
fertilization,” but that fragmentation prevents us from grasping causes and connections.
89 Dewey notes  also that  specialized knowledge aims to be “abstract” which practically
means that “it is not conceived in terms of its bearing on human life” (171). Plainly, the
commitment  to  value-neutrality  requires  this.  The  upshot,  of  course,  is  not  value-
neutrality, but as Veblen insisted, scientific legitimation of “usages and conventions that
have by habit become embedded in the received scheme of use and wont, and so have
been found to be good and right.” Social science happily conspires in persuading us that
the poor have only themselves to blame.
90 Dewey argues forcefully that  what  counts as  “news” in our daily papers is  rendered
completely unintelligible in terms of its connections but fails to argue that this tendency
is  reinforced  by  “fact-gathering”  social  science.  He  is  correct  that  “a  genuine  social
science would manifest its reality in the daily press, while learned books and articles
supply and polish tools of inquiry” (347), but of course, it is precisely because “we” are
not  journalists  but  “social  scientists”  that  we  write  jargonized  “learned”  books  and
articles. As Lynd said, we are either “scholars” or “technicians” – working for whoever
will pay the bill.
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91 Finally, for all of Dewey’s interest in education, he makes no mention of the disastrous
consequences  of  current  patterns  of  education  in  the  social  sciences.  Instead  of
cultivating what Mills called “the sociological imagination,” we offer students textbooks
which guarantee disciplinary fragmentation, empty abstractions and uncritical thought.
Instead of seeking causes and insisting on making connections, we require “disciplinary”
integrity. Instead of raising questions about “habits embedded in the received scheme of
things,” we seek “relations of variables.”
92 Dewey was surely on the right track when, as early as his essay on Renan, he offered some
reasons for these patterns of ideology and disinformation. He then wrote that we do not
yet appreciate “the dead weight of class interest which resists all attempts of science to
take practical form and become a social motor” (EW 4: 17). I conclude by saying that we
still do not – itself a function of the failure of the present practices of the social sciences.
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NOTES
1. See Dorothy Ross, The Origins of American Social Science (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1991).  She  writes:  “[Scientism]  was  the  result  of  a  long-standing  commitment  perennially
deferred,  an  effort  to  make  good on  the  positivist  claim that  only  natural  science  provided
certain knowledge and conferred the power of prediction and control. With science now defined
by its method, scientism demanded that the requirements of natural scientific method dominate
the practice of social science” (Ross 1991: 390). She seems wrongly to assume that the positivists
provide a generally  correct  understanding of  natural  science.  As regards social  science,  Ross
seems to favor interpretative models “available in history and cultural anthropology” or “the
generalizing and interpretative model offered by Max Weber” (Ross 1991: 473).  I  argued in A
History and Philosophy of the Social Sciences (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1987) and in A Realist Philosophy
of Social Science (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006) that there was a third, critical
realist alternative. I suggest in what follows that James and Dewey seem to have stumbled toward
this alternative, ambiguously realist, and emphatically neither positivist nor “interpretative.”
2. By the 1970s, every pillar of the positivist consensus among philosophers of science had come
apart.  See  Manicas,  A History  and  Philosophy  of  the  Social  Sciences, Chapter  12  for  a  summary.
However,  the  defining  features  of  this  consensus,  for  example,  the  positivist  account  of
explanation  and  causality,  has,  by  virtue  of  institutionally  inertia,  hardly  touched  American
social scientists. For evidence, see almost any textbook in social science. Indeed, contemporary
economics, often considered the most mature of social sciences, is also the most unapologetically
positivist.
3. Especially  with  the  work  of  R. W. Sleeper,  The  Necessity  of  Pragmatism  (New  Haven,  Yale
University Press, 1986) and Tom Burke, Dewey’s New Logic: A Reply to Russell (Chicago, University of
Chicago Press, 1994), we are just now beginning to get clear about the central role of his Logic: The
Theory of Inquiry – even if the two most recent full-length accounts, one by an historian, Robert
Westbrook (John Dewey and American Pragmatism, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1991), the other
by a philosopher (Alan Ryan, John Dewey and the High Time of Liberalism, New York, Norton, 1997),
say nothing of any use about how this bears on Dewey’s conception of science, but especially
social science. As regard pragmatism and post-modernism, see, for example, “A Social Theory
Dialogue between Peter Manicas and Patrick Baert,” 7 (2), 62-101, 2008.
4. J. Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, Rev. Ed., (New York, Basic Books, 1966), Chapter 14.
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5. P. Duhem,  The  Aim and  Structure  of  Physical  Theory  [1906],  (Princeton,  Princeton University
Press, 1954), 7, 19. Anti-positivists included, prominently, Hermann von Helmholtz, James Clerk
Maxwell and J. J. Thomson. For example, Helmholtz insisted that “the word Ursache (which I use
here precisely and literally) means that existing something [Bestehende] which lies hidden behind
the  changes  we  perceive.  It  is  the  hidden  but  continually  existent  basis  of  phenomena”
(Helmholtz 1971: 521). See Peirce and James, below.
6. Much more complete sketches may be found in my A History and Philosophy of the Social Sciences
and “The Social Science Disciplines: The American Model,” in B. Wittrock & P. Wagner (eds.),
Yearbook Sociology of the Sciences (Dordrecht, Reidel, 1990). A still fuller account is to be found in
Ross, Origins of American Social Science. For discussion of the different historical experiences of
European social science, see Wagner, Peter, Wittrock. Bjorn, & Richard Whitely (eds.), Discourses
on  Society:  The  Shaping  of  the  Social  Science  Disciplines,  Sociology  of  the  Science  Year-book,  XV,
(Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), especially, perhaps, the fine summary essay by
Wagner  and  Wittrock,  “States,  Institutions,  Discourses:  A  Comparative  Perspective  on  the
Structuration of the Social  Sciences,” in Wagner et  al.  (ibid.),  331-58.  The volume treats nine-
teenth  century  European  differences  well,  but  no  effort  was  made  to  examine  traditions
elsewhere. Historically rooted differences remain in contemporary practices in European social
science,  e.g.,  in the absence of  a separate faculty for the social  sciences in France,  or in the
French admixture of neo- classical theory and engineering in economic science. A license degree
in economics was not created until 1958.
7. Lenin clearly  saw that  the issues  were important.  In  his  too little  studied Materialism and
Empirio-Criticism  (1908)  (Moscow,  Progress  Publishers),  Lenin  defended  Engels's  materialism
against those “bold warriors, who proudly allude to the ‘modern theory of knowledge,’ ‘recent
philosophy’ (or ‘recent positivism’), the ‘philosophy of the natural sciences’ or even more boldly,
‘the  philosophy  of  natural  science  of  the  twentieth  century’”  (Empirio-Criticism:  7).  Dilthey
rejected totally “the philosophy of the natural sciences as pertinent for the human sciences.”
Weber, of course, held that the need for verstehen critically distinguished the human or cultural
sciences,  but  held  also  that  these  sciences  aimed  at  causal  explanation,  understood  in  anti-
Humean terms.  See  Manicas,  A  Realist  Philosophy  of  Science  (Cambridge,  Cambridge  University
Press, 2006), Chapter 5.
8. See  Wittrock,  Bjorn,  “The  Modern  University:  The  Three  Transformations,”  in Rothblatt,
Sheldon & Bjorn Wittrock (eds.),  The European and American University Since 1800:  Historical  and
Sociological Essays, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, (1993).
9. Bledstein, Burton. The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle Class and the Development of Higher
Education  in  America,  New York,  W. W. Norton,  (1976);  See  also,  Hofstader Richard,  The  Age  of
Reform, New York, Knopf, (1955).
10. He explicitly attacked Karl Pearson and the anti-metaphysicians: “Those eminent authorities
who speak for a colorless mathematical formulation invariably and necessarily fall back on the
(essentially metaphysical) preconception of causation as soon as they go into the actual work of
scientific inquiry” (Veblen 1961: 15).
11. Cited from Neil J. Smelzer (1986: 27).
12. For a fuller account, see Manicas, Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior, 32 (3) (September,
2002). Owen Flanagan Jr. has provided a reading of Principles along the lines of an non-reductive
neuropsychology in his The Science of the Mind, Cambridge, MIT press, (1984).
13. The failure to see the novelty and power of the philosophy of science found in his Principles is
partly explained by his self criticism of psychology as a science (below), and, subsequently, by the
overwhelming attention given his later philosophy, especially, of course, his popular Pragmatism 
and Essays in Radical Empiricism.
14. Letter to Henry Holt, his publisher, May 1990, quoted from Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought
and Character of William James, two vols, Boston, Little, Brown, (1935).
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15. In “John Dewey and American Psychology,” I argue that Dewey’s reflex arc essay is the point
of  departure  of  a  unique approach to  what  I  term an “ecological  psychology.”  It  is  another
unfulfilled  Deweyan  program  which  anticipates  fatal  criticisms  of  much  recent  “cognitive
psychology.”
16. See my War and Democracy, Oxford, Blackwell, (1989, Chapter 8).
17. See also Logic (LW 12: 501-2).
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